Tuesday, 31 May 2016

grammar - How can a pronoun "one" be a noun?

In:



  • One should be careful.

... the word one is a third person singular pronoun. Notice that even though it is singular, it doesn't need a Determiner. This pronoun one cannot be modified by adjectives and can't be postmodified by preposition phrases.



In:



  • Give me one jumper.

... the numeral one is functioning as a Determiner in a noun phrase. It's a determinative according to the CaGEL. This word can also not be modified by adjectives:



  • *Give me blue one jumper. (ungrammatical)

In:



  • Give me the big one at the back

The word one is a bona fide noun. Notice that it can take a range of Determiners such as the, this, that, my. It also has a plural form like other nouns (and when plural can also have Determiners that occur with plural nouns such as many, more, some):



  • Give me some big ones from the back.

Notice also that like other nouns it can be modified by adjectives, such as big in the example above. And like other nouns it can be postmodified by preposition phrases. So in the example above we see it modified by the preposition phrase from the back.



The OP's question




There was only one.




In older grammars this one might be regarded as a pronoun. In modern grammars such as the Cambridge Grammar of the English Language (Huddleston & Pullum 2002), this would be regarded as a determinative occurring in a fused Determiner Head construction. It is a bit like the middle example above give me one jumper but with the jumper part missing. In the Original Poster's example it means:



  • There was only one [event].

The Original Poster's sentence is perfectly grammatical. We quite often use the adverb (as opposed to the adjective) only to modify noun phrases:



  • It was only [a small bump].

In the Original Poster's example, one counts as a whole noun phrase.

single word requests - What is the opposite of a "reply"?

What is the opposite of a “reply”?
"These writings can have pair wise relationships with other writings. In these relationships they can either be the reply or the ________."



+1 for a valid question (not sure why others would want to downvote it)




Short answer : there is no specific word for opposite of reply in generalized communication. The best you can get is when you restrict to "questions/queries/requests" for which you get "responses/replies/answers".




Any correct opposite of generalized "reply" is going to be so generalized that it will be almost meaningless : In the most generalize view, action or event is the opposite of a reply or reaction.
Eg, you can reply to a question/query/request. You can also reply to a comment or a greeting. You can also reply to a reply ! You can also reply to an absence of a reply !




Consider this series of exchanges between X & Y & Z, where words in square brackets are informational :



X: Hello All. [ greeting ]
Y: Hello X. [ reply to greeting ? ]
X: I need help on topic ABC. [ not a question ; probably a request ; but surely a simple statement. Is it also a reply to Y ? ]
Y: Go on, I know about ABC. [ reply to request ? statement ? ]
X: Who invented ABC ? [ specific question ]
Y: It was invented by Z in 2013 [ specific reply ]
Z: Do not give wrong information about year of invention ! [ reply ? reaction ? ]
Y: Well, well, well ! I did not know that Z was in this group ! [ reply ? statement ? comment ? ]
X: Hey Z, you invented ABC, but 2013 is wrong. Which is the correct year ? [ specific question ]
.
.
.
.
X: Z, you there ? [ reply to ... what ? reply to absence of reply ? ]
Y: Hey X, given his geographical location, Z is probably sleeping now. You might get a reply tomorrow [ reply from Y, but question was for Z ]




Basically, there can be no logical pairing of [S,reply to S] where you want a word for S.
If the sequence is {S1,reply to S1,S2,reply to S2,...} then even [reply to S1,S2] is also a pairing, hence there can be no specific word for S.




In the most generalized view, every thing can be considered "an action or an event" and the response or the reply is the reaction, which is so generalized that it is almost meaningless.




I hope I have not converted this question into a philosophical issue of semantics, but would be happy to elaborate if any query is raised.

Why does Moorcock consider the Lord of the Rings reactionist?

I was not an English major and can't address critical theory issues. I did, however, take two courses in political theory during college, and I don't see where Moorcock's comments in that article have much to do with it, unless you consider them a sloppy way of piggybacking on Marx. Honestly, it seems that he feels an aversion to Tolkien's work, and therefore has come up with criticisms in response. (While this is only my personal impression, I think that many Tolkien haters suffer from a visceral gut-reaction to which they have attached arguments. I also think that most of them hated The Lord of the Rings so much that they never bothered to read The Silmarillion, which offers situations that are far more morally complicated than those that exist in the LotR. Evil Elves! Imagine! Sadly, most Tolkien haters don't.)



From the article, I gathered that Moorcock's slamming of the "There and Back Again" theme was aimed directly at The Hobbit, in which case it is somewhat defensible--if you focus only on that book, and not at Bilbo's larger life-story, let alone the full history of the War of the Ring. The problem with slamming the "There and Back Again" theme is twofold. First, the story is a children's book. If I recall correctly, Tolkien eventually wished he had written the book at the same level as The Lord of the Rings. So it important to recognize that Tolkien grew quite a bit as a writer and mythologist after The Hobbit was written. Second, Bilbo does change. That's the whole point of the story. He starts out as a person who is growing into a rather dull middle age with a narrow, self-centered view of the world. His adventure forces him to change. Perhaps the change isn't as large a change as Moorcock would like to have seen, but that's Moorcock's personal preference. It doesn't necessarily mean that anything is wrong with the story as such. And of course, if you look at Bilbo's life story, the Ring turns out to be evil, and even though he never bears the brunt of it, he does eventually become restless, leave the Shire, and ultimately abandon Middle-Earth altogether.



As to the charge that Tolkien offers “a pernicious confirmation of the values of a morally bankrupt middle class.” First of all, I think it is a good rule to become suspicious any time someone starts talking about a "morally bankrupt middle class." That's old cant--I know it goes back to Marx, and my guess is that an Enlightenment philosopher or two said something similar before him. Possibly also Rousseau, in attitude, if not explicitly. At any rate, by now that rhetoric doesn't really mean anything, especially considering that Moorcock could probably be considered middle class himself. (And his rebellion is, in many ways, a typical rebellion of the middle class against itself! It's not uncommon to find people who benefitted from growing up in the middle class insulting the middle class.) In any case, Tolkien would have been the first person to have agreed that the middle class was morally bankrupt. Tolkien was a very traditional Roman Catholic, and he believed that Original Sin applies to everyone--rich, poor, and middle class all included. To top off his religious beliefs, he had a fairly pessimistic temperament, especially later in life. To consider Tolkien's vision a cozy conservative one is to misunderstand who he was as a person.



Hobbit values (unlike those of other races) do align somewhat with a rural English middle class, and Tolkien makes it very clear that Hobbitry has both a good and a bad side. On one hand, Hobbits are simple, peaceful creatures, and those qualities are admirable. Making things more complicated is not necessarily a virtue (a view Moorcock obviously disagrees with in his "Epic Pooh" essay--he apparently believes that superior writing is always characterized by tension and moral complexity). On the other hand, Hobbits can be narrowminded, foolish, and maddening. For a Hobbit to be very helpful to the rest of the world, he has to be pushed out of his comfort zone, as many of Tolkien's Hobbits are. Bilbo, Frodo, Merry, and Pippin all have ties to the more adventurous Hobbit families. According to Tolkien, Sam is the normal Hobbit, and Tolkien knew that some of his readers who had liked the book found Sam irritating. Sam's harsh behavior toward Gollum is one reason for Gollum's betrayal, but it was normal Hobbit behavior--Sam simply wasn't a broad enough thinker to realize the possible consequences of his actions until afterward. Tolkien had served with less well-educated men during WWI, and he used his stories to show their virtues while exploring their weaknesses.



As I said, Tolkien was staunchly Catholic, so, yes, Christianity lies at the back of his writings. He was conservative, but not in a way that would neatly fit into any current definition of the term. (He noted in one of his letters that, where government was concerned, he favored either anarchism or an unconstitutional monarchy. Basically, however, he was apolitical. None of his published letters deal very much with the British government.) He was also an environmentalist before environmentalism existed as a movement. Yes, he partly wanted to preserve the environment because of nostalgia for his childhood. He also simply loved trees. And, like many of his generation, he was a WWI veteran concerned about the effects of total war. Mechanization worried Tolkien because people were implementing inventions that destroyed the landscape and/or killed other people. The dropping of the atomic bomb horrified him. Tolkien also opposed imperialism and unbridled capitalism. Conservative? Sure. But most so-called "conservatives" today, at least in the United States, would hate the man's guts. The better you know Tolkien as a person, the more difficult he is to pigeonhole.

Set theory and alternative foundations

This was going to be a comment to Joel David Hamkins's answer on geometry, but it didn't fit.



+1 This is one of the most clear-minded things I have read on MO. It does not make a mockery of Foundations and still says something non-obvious.



I'm very skeptical of all this business with category theory being a foundation for mathematics. First, whenever anyone talks about it, it always seems to be somebody else's work. It's become something of a meme that "Bill Lawvere has proposals to provide foundations for math through category theory", but we don't ever see details provided.



Second, are we really to understand that we are going to add small integers with arrows and diagrams? Draw circles and lines, and say that the latter meet at most once? I think people work in trans-Euclidean hyperschemes of infinite type so much, they forget that math includes these things.



As Wittgenstein remarks in the Investigations, just because you can express A in terms of B, it does not mean that B actually underlies A.

adjectives - What is "newbie" as an adverb?

Noobishly/n00bishly is the most widely used adverbial form, I think.




If you talk that n00bishly about it, do you even know what it is?







can someone noobishly splain to me the O(1), O(N), O(N^2) and O(log N)?




After googling for various possible adverbifications and comparing hit counts, this seems by far the most common:



newbishly    2,390  
noobishly 14,300
n00bishly 13,800
newbily 4,670 (mostly not genuine adverbial usages)
noobily 2,600 (ditto)
n00bily 100 (ditto)


Google hit counts are, of course, not a terribly precise measurement; but in this case the results seem reasonably convincing.



The other relevant question is whether newbie, noob, n00b themselves get used as adverbs. This is of course much harder to search for; I’ve not been able to find any examples, and I can’t imagine any that would sound natural, but that doesn’t mean it doesn’t happen.

reference request - totally disconnected and zero-dimensional spaces

Following Victor Protsak's suggestion, I took the answer to this question and turned it into a paper found here Ultraparacompactness and Ultranormality, so it may be easier to read that paper than to read the answer here on MO.



The notions that you are looking for are ultraparacompactness (covering dimension depending on how you define it), ultranormality (large inductive dimension zero), and of course the notion of a zero-dimensional space (small inductive dimension zero). A Hausdorff space $X$ is said to be ultraparacompact if every open cover can be refined by a partition into clopen sets. It should be noted that there appears to be some disagreement on the definition of covering dimension since some people require your original cover to be finite and some people consider arbitrary covers, so the notion of ultraparacompactness may or may not coincide with the notion of covering dimension zero. It seems as if the standard but not universal practice is to define the covering dimension in terms of finite covers. The spaces with large inductive dimension zero are known as ultranormal spaces. In other words, a Hausdorff space is ultranormal if and only if whenever $R,S$ are disjoint closed sets, there is a clopen set $C$ with $Rsubseteq C,Ssubseteq C^{c}$. Ultraparacompactness, ultranormality, and zero-dimensionality are the zero-dimensional analogues of the notions of paracompactness, normality, and regularity. Many in the notions and results from general topology have analogous zero-dimensional notions and results. Clearly every ultraparacompact space is paracompact, and every ultranormal space is normal. It is easy to see that every ultraparacompact space is ultranormal and every ultranormal space is zero-dimensional. However, the converses fail to hold.



$largemathbf{Examples}$



Every compact totally disconnected space is ultraparacompact and hence ultranormal as well.



The space $omega_{1}$ of all countable ordinals with the order topology is ultranormal. If $R,S$ are two disjoint closed subsets of $omega_{1}$, then either $R$ or $S$ is bounded, so say $R$ is bounded by an ordinal $alpha$. Then since $[0,alpha]$ is compact and zero-dimensional, the set $[0,alpha]$ is ultranormal. Therefore there is a clopen subset $Csubseteq[0,alpha]$ with $Rsubseteq C$ and $Scap C=emptyset$. However, the set $C$ is clopen in $omega_{1}$ as well. Therefore $omega_{1}$ is ultranormal. To the contrary, the space $omega_{1}$ is not even paracompact. The cover ${[0,alpha)|alpha<omega_{1}}$ however does not have a locally finite open refinement since if $mathcal{U}$ is an open refinement of $[0,alpha)$, then for each $alpha<omega_{1}$ there is some $x_{alpha}<alpha$ where $(x_{alpha},alpha]subseteq U$ for some $Uinmathcal{U}$. However, since the mapping $alphamapsto x_{alpha}$ is regressive, everyone who knows anything about set theory can tell you that there is an ordinal $beta$ where $x_{alpha}=beta$ for uncountably many $alpha$. Since $mathcal{U}$ refines ${[0,alpha)|alpha<omega_{1}}$, each $Uinmathcal{U}$ is bounded, so the ordinal $beta$ must be contained in uncountably many $Uinmathcal{U}$.



Now consider the space $mathbb{R}$ with the lower limit topology. In other words, with this topology, $mathbb{R}$ is generated by the basis ${[a,b)|a<b}$. Then $[0,infty)$ is an ultraparacompact space with this topology. Let $mathcal{U}$ be an open cover of $[0,infty)$. Let $x_{0}=0$. If $alpha$ is an ordinal and $sup{x_{beta}|beta<alpha}<infty$, then let $x_{alpha}$ be a real number such that $x_{alpha}>sup{x_{beta}|beta<alpha}$ and $[sup{x_{beta}|beta<alpha},x_{alpha})subseteq U$ for some $Uinmathcal{U}$. Then ${[x_{alpha},x_{alpha+1})|alpha}$ is a partition of $[0,infty)$ into clopen sets that refines $mathcal{U}$. Thus, $[0,infty)$ is ultraparacompact. The space $mathbb{R}$ with the lower limit topology is ultraparacompact as well since $mathbb{R}$ is isomorphic to the countable sum of spaces $[0,infty)$ with the lower limit topology. However, it is a well known counterexample that the product $mathbb{R}timesmathbb{R}$ is not even normal. We conclude that $mathbb{R}timesmathbb{R}$ is a zero-dimensional space which is not ultranormal.



In the paper Nonequality of Dimensions for Metric Spaces, Prabir Roy shows that certain space $Delta$ is a complete metric space of cardinality continuum which is zero-dimensional, but not ultranormal, and hence not ultraparacompact. In fact, later in the paper Not every 0-dimensional realcompact space is $mathbb{N}$-compact, Peter Nyikos shows that this space is not even $mathbb{N}$-compact (a space is $mathbb{N}$-compact if and only if it can be embedded as a closed subspace of a product $mathbb{N}^{I}$ for some set $I$). This result strengthens Roy's result since every ultraparacompact space of non-measurable cardinality is $mathbb{N}$-compact and the first measurable cardinal is terribly large if it even exists.



A metric $d$ on a set $X$ is said to be an ultrametric if $d$ satisfies the strong triangle inequality: $d(x,z)leq Max(d(x,y),d(y,z))$, and a metric space $(X,d)$ is said to be an ultrametric space if $d$ is an ultrametric. Every ultrametric space is ultraparacompact.



There are zero-dimensional locally compact spaces that are not ultranormal. The Tychonoff plank $X:=((omega_{1}+1)times(omega+1))setminus{(omega_{1},omega)}$ is zero-dimensional (even strongly zero-dimensional; i.e. $beta X$ is zero-dimensional) but not ultranormal.



$largemathbf{Results}$



A subset $Z$ of a space $X$ is said to be a zero set if there is a continuous function $f:Xrightarrow[0,1]$ such that $Z=f^{-1}[{0}]$. A completely regular space $X$ is said to be strongly zero-dimensional if whenever $Z_{1},Z_{2}$ are disjoint zero sets, there is a clopen set $C$ with $Z_{1}subseteq C$ and $Z_{2}subseteq C^{c}$. It is not too hard to show that a completely regular space $X$ is strongly zero-dimensional if and only if the Stone-Cech compactification $beta X$ is zero-dimensional. We say that a cover $mathcal{R} $ of a topological space $X$ is point-finite if ${Rinmathcal{R}|xin R}$ is finite for each $xin X$, and we say that $mathcal{R}$ is locally finite if each $xin X$ has a neighborhood $U$ such that ${Rinmathcal{R}|Ucap Rneqemptyset}$ is finite. Recall that a Hausdorff space is paracompact iff every open cover has a locally finite open refinement.



A uniform space $(X,mathcal{U})$ is said to be non-Archimedean if $mathcal{U}$ is generated by equivalence relations. In other words, for each $Rinmathcal{U}$ there is an equivalence relation $Einmathcal{U}$ with $Esubseteq R$. Clearly, every non-Archimedean uniform space is zero-dimensional. If $(X,mathcal{U})$ is a uniform space, then let $H(X)$ denote the set of all closed subsets of $X$. If $Einmathcal{U}$, then let $hat{E}$ be the relation on $H(X)$ where $(C,D)inhat{E}$ if and only if $Csubseteq E[D]={yin X|(x,y)in Etextrm{for some}xin D}$ and $Dsubseteq E[C]$. Then the system ${hat{E}|Einmathcal{U}}$ generates a uniformity $hat{mathcal{U}}$ on $H(X)$ called the hyperspace uniformity. A uniform space $(X,mathcal{U})$ is said to be supercomplete if the hyperspace $H(X)$ is a complete uniform space.



$mathbf{Proposition}$ Let $X$ be a locally compact zero-dimensional space. Then $X$ is ultraparacompact if and only if $X$ can be partitioned into a family of compact open sets.



$mathbf{Proof}$ The direction $leftarrow$ is fairly trivial. To prove $rightarrow$ assume that $X$ is a locally compact zero-dimensional space. Then let $mathcal{U}$ the collection of all open sets $U$ such that $overline{U}$ is compact. Then since $X$ is locally compact, $mathcal{U}$ is a cover for $X$. Therefore there is a partition $P$ of $X$ into clopen sets that refines $mathcal{U}$. Clearly each $Rin P$ is a compact open subset of $X$. $textrm{QED}$



$textbf{Theorem}$ Let $X$ be a Hausdorff space. Then $X$ is normal if and only if whenever $(U_{alpha})_{alphainmathcal{A}}$ is a point-finite open covering of $X$, there is an open covering $(V_{alpha})_{alphainmathcal{A}}$ such that $overline{V_{alpha}}subseteq U_{alpha}$ for $alphainmathcal{A}$ and $V_{alpha}neqemptyset$ whenever $U_{alpha}neqemptyset$.///



To prove the above result, one first well orders the set $mathcal{A}$, then one shrinks the sets $U_{alpha}$ to sets $V_{alpha}$ in such a way that you still cover your space $X$ at every point in the induction process. See the book Topology by James Dugundji for a proof of the above result.



$textbf{Theorem}$ Let $X$ be a Hausdorff space. The following are equivalent.



  1. $X$ is ultranormal.


  2. Whenever $(U_{alpha})_{alphainmathcal{A}}$ is a point-finite open cover of $X$, there is a clopen cover $(V_{alpha})_{alphainmathcal{A}}$ such that $V_{alpha}subseteq U_{alpha}$ for each $alpha$ and $V_{alpha}neqemptyset$ whenever $U_{alpha}neqemptyset$.


  3. If $(U_{alpha})_{alphainmathcal{A}}$ is a locally-finite open cover of $X$, then there is system $(P_{alpha})_{alphainmathcal{A}}$ of clopen sets such that $P_{alpha}subseteq U_{alpha}$ for $alphainmathcal{A}$ and $P_{alpha}cap P_{beta}=emptyset$ whenever $alpha,betainmathcal{A}$ and $alphaneqbeta$.


  4. $X$ is normal and strongly zero-dimensional.


$textbf{Proof}$
$1rightarrow 2$. Since $X$ is normal, there is an open cover $(W_{alpha})_{alphainmathcal{A}}$ such that $overline{W_{alpha}}subseteq U_{alpha}$ for each $alphainmathcal{A}$ and $W_{alpha}neqemptyset$ whenever $U_{alpha}neqemptyset$. Since $X$ is ultranormal, for each $alphainmathcal{A}$, there is some clopen set $V_{alpha}$ with $overline{W_{alpha}}subseteq V_{alpha}subseteq U_{alpha}$.



$2rightarrow 3$. Now assume that $(U_{alpha})_{alphainmathcal{A}}$ is a locally-finite open over of $X$. Let $(V_{alpha})_{alphainmathcal{A}}$ be a clopen cover of $X$ such that $V_{alpha}subseteq U_{alpha}$ for each $alphainmathcal{A}$. Well order the set $mathcal{A}$. The family $(V_{alpha})_{alphainmathcal{A}}$ is locally-finite, so since each $V_{alpha}$ is closed, for each $alphainmathcal{A}$, the union $bigcup_{beta<alpha}V_{beta}$ is closed. Clearly $bigcup_{beta<alpha}V_{beta}$ is open as well, so $bigcup_{beta<alpha}V_{beta}$ is clopen. Let
$P_{alpha}=V_{alpha}setminus(bigcup_{beta<alpha}V_{beta})$. Then $(P_{alpha})_{alphainmathcal{A}}$ is the required partition of $X$ into clopen sets.



$3rightarrow 1,1rightarrow 4$. This is fairly obvious.



$4rightarrow 1$. This is a trivial consequence of Urysohn's lemma.



$textbf{QED}$



$textbf{Theorem}$ Let $X$ be a Hausdorff space. The following are equivalent.



  1. $X$ is ultraparacompact.


  2. $X$ is ultranormal and paracompact.


  3. $X$ is strongly zero-dimensional and paracompact.


  4. Every open cover of $X$ has a locally finite clopen refinement.


  5. $X$ is zero-dimensional and satisfies the following property: let $I$ be an ideal on the Boolean algebra $mathfrak{B}(X)$ of clopen subsets of $X$ such that $bigcup I=X$ and if $P$ is a partition of $X$ into clopen sets, then $bigcup(Pcap I)in I$. Then $I=mathfrak{B}(X)$.


  6. $X$ has a compatible supercomplete non-Archimedean uniformity. ///


The paper $omega_{mu}$-additive topological spaces by Giuliano Artico and Roberto Moresco gives several characterizations of when a $P_{kappa}$-space (a space where the intersection of less than $kappa$ many open sets is open) is ultraparacompact.



$largetextbf{The Point-Free Context}$.



The following results on zero-dimensionality, ultranormality, and ultraparacompactness are part of my own research. If you think I have wrote too much already, you don't like me, or if you don't believe in pointless topology, then I suggest that you stop reading this answer here.



The notions of ultranormality, zero-dimensionality, and ultraparacompactness make sense in a point-free context, and by a generalization of Stone duality, the notions of ultranormality, zero-dimensionality, and ultraparacompactness translate nicely to certain kinds of Boolean algebras with extra structure.



A frame is a complete lattice that satisfies the following infinite distributivity law
$$xwedgebigvee_{iin I}y_{i}=bigvee_{iin I}(xwedge y_{i}).$$
If $X$ is a topological space, then the collection of all open subsets of $X$ forms a frame. Frames generalize the notion of a topological space, and frames are the central object of study in point-free topology. For Hausdorff spaces, no information is lost simply by considering the lattice of open sets of the topological space. More specifically, if $X,Y$ are Hausdorff spaces and the lattices of open sets of $X$ and $Y$ respectively are isomorphic, then $X$ and $Y$ are themselves isomorphic. Furthermore, many notions and theorems from general topology can be generalized to the point-free context. Moreover, the notion of a frame is very interesting from a purely lattice theoretic perspective without even looking at the topological perspective. The reader is referred to the excellent new book Frames and Locales: Topology Without Points by Picado and Pultr for more information on point-free topology.



For notation, if $X$ is a poset and $R,Ssubseteq X$, then $R$ refines $S$ (written $Rpreceq S$) if for each $rin R$ there is some $sin S$ with $rleq s$. If $xin X$, then define $downarrow x:={yin X|yleq x}$.



A Boolean admissibility system is a pair $(B,mathcal{A})$ such that $B$ is a Boolean algebra and $mathcal{A}$ is a collection of subsets of $B$ with least upper bounds such that



i. $mathcal{A}$ contains all finite subsets of $B$,



ii. if $Rinmathcal{A},Ssubseteqdownarrowbigvee R,Rpreceq S$, then $Sinmathcal{A}$ as well,



iii. if $Rinmathcal{A}$ and $R_{r}inmathcal{A},bigvee R_{r}=r$ for $rin R$, then
$bigcup_{rin R}R_{r}inmathcal{A}$,



iv. if $Rinmathcal{A}$, then ${awedge r|rin R}inmathcal{A}$ as well.



Intuitively, a Boolean admissibility system is Boolean algebra along with a notion of which least upper bounds are important and which least upper bounds are not important.



For example, if $B$ is a Boolean algebra, and $mathcal{A}$ is the collection of all subsets of $B$ with least upper bounds, then $(B,mathcal{A})$ is a Boolean admissibility system.



If $A$ is a Boolean subalgebra of $B$, and $mathcal{A}$ is the collection of all subsets of $R$ where the least upper bound $bigvee^{B}R$ exists in $B$ and $bigvee^{B}Rin A$. Then $(A,mathcal{A})$ is a Boolean admissibility system.



A Boolean admissibility system $(B,mathcal{A})$ is said to be subcomplete if whenever $R,Ssubseteq B$ and $Rcup Sinmathcal{A}$ and $rwedge s=emptyset$ whenever $rin R,sin S$, then $Rinmathcal{A}$ and $Sinmathcal{A}$.



If $L$ is a frame, then an element $xin L$ is said to be complemented if there is an element $y$ such that $xwedge y=0$ and $xvee y=1$. The element $y$ is said to be the complement of $y$ and one can easily show that the element $y$ is unique. The notion of a complemented element is the point-free generalization of the notion of a clopen set. Let $mathfrak{B}(L)$ denote the set of complemented elements in $L$. Then $mathfrak{B}(L)$ is a sublattice of $L$. In fact, $mathfrak{B}(L)$ is a Boolean lattice. A frame $L$ is said to be zero-dimensional if $x=bigvee{yinmathfrak{B}(L)|yleq x}$ for each $xin L$.



A Boolean based frame is a pair $(L,B)$ where $L$ is a frame and $B$ is a Boolean subalgebra of $mathfrak{B}(L)$ such that $x=bigvee{binmathfrak{B}(L)|bleq x}$ for each $xin L$. Clearly every Boolean based frame is zero-dimensional.



A zero-dimensional frame $L$ is said to be ultranormal if whenever $avee b=1$, there is a complemented element $cin L$ such that $cleq a$ and $c'leq b$.



A cover of a frame $L$ is a subset $Csubseteq L$ with $bigvee C=1$. A partition of a frame $L$ is a subset $psubseteq Lsetminus{0}$ with $bigvee p=1$ and where $awedge b=0$ whenever $a,bin p,aneq b$.



A zero-dimensional frame $L$ is said to be ultraparacompact if whenever $C$ is a cover of $L$ there is a partition $p$ that refines $C$.



There is a duality between the category of Boolean admissibility systems and Boolean based frames. If $(B,mathcal{A})$ is a Boolean admissibility system, then let $C_{mathcal{A}}$ be the collection of all ideals $Isubseteq B$ such that if $Rinmathcal{A}$ and $Rsubseteq I$, then $bigvee Rin I$ as well.



If $(B,mathcal{A})$ is a Boolean admissibility system, then $mathcal{V}(B,mathcal{A}):=(C_{mathcal{A}},{downarrow b|bin B})$ is a Boolean based frame. Similarly, if $(L,A)$ is a Boolean based frame, then $mathcal{W}(L,A):=(A,{Rsubseteq A|bigvee^{L}Rin A})$ is a Boolean admissibility system. Furthermore, these correspondences give an equivalence between the category of Boolean admissibility systems and the category of Boolean based frames. Hence, we obtain a type of Stone-duality for zero-dimensional frames. If $(L,A)$ is a Boolean based frame, then $A=mathfrak{B}(L)$ if and only if $mathcal{W}(L,A)$ is subcomplete. Since $(L,mathfrak{B}(L))$ is a Boolean based frame iff $L$ is a zero-dimensional frame, we conclude that the category of zero-dimensional frames is equivalent to the category of subcomplete Boolean admissibility systems.



If $(B,mathcal{A})$ is a Boolean admissibility system, then $
mathcal{V}(B,mathcal{A})=(C_{mathcal{A}},{downarrow b|bin B})$ is ultranormal with
${downarrow b|bin B}=mathfrak{B}(C_{mathcal{A}})$ if and only if whenever $I,Jinmathcal{C}_{mathcal{A}}$, then ${avee b|ain I,bin J}inmathcal{C}_{mathcal{A}}$ as well. Hence, ultranormality simply means that the join of finitely many ideals in $mathcal{C}_{mathcal{A}}$ is an ideal in $mathcal{C}_{mathcal{A}}$.



If $(B,mathcal{A})$ is a subcomplete Boolean admissibility system, then $mathcal{V}(B,mathcal{A})$ is ultraparacompact if and only if whenever $Rinmathcal{A}$ there is some $Sinmathcal{A}$ with $Spreceq R,bigvee S=bigvee R$ and $awedge b=0$ whenever $a,bin S$ and $aneq b$. Hence, the ultraparacompactness of frames translates into a version of ultraparacompactness in the dual subcomplete Boolean admissibility systems.

What word means "the changes of a place"?

I do not think there can be a single-word substitute for the idea of "changes taking place in an area with time."



There are at least two distinct aspects to the changes: physical-geographical and demographic-cultural.



Tucker Sharon reviewed Carl Ortwin Sauer's "The Morphology of Landscape (1925)" in his blog. Extracts:




… the natural landscape as a static baseline for culture-induced change. This is where he finds geognosy – “which regards kind and position of material but not historical succession” (334) – should be the primary science that cultural geographers should concern themselves with.



Over the course of this essay Sauer develops two formulae: one describing the natural landscape and the other describing the cultural landscape. The natural landscape is described as the combination of forms designated by climate, land (surface, soil, drainage and mineral resource), sea and coast, and vegetation as they have been shaped through time by geognostic, climatic and vegetational factors. (337) The cultural landscape is the combination of population (density and mobility), housing (plan and structure), production and communication forms as they have been articulated by culture through the medium of the natural landscape. (343) Again, Sauer stresses that causality and change with time come from cultural processes, not natural ones. [emphasis mine]




Currently, geographic morphology (geomorphology) and cultural morphology as distinct disciplines study the "changes taking place in an area with time."

How did the meta-crisis Doctor survive (or remain sane) when Doctor-Donna didn’t?

From the Doctor Who episode Journey's End transcript:




DONNA: I thought we could try the planet Felspoon. Just because. What a good name, Felspoon. Apparently, it's got mountains that sway in the breeze. Mountains that move. Can you imagine?
DOCTOR: And how do you know that?
DONNA: Because it's in your head. And if it's in your head, it's in mine.
DOCTOR: And how does that feel?
DONNA: Brilliant! Fantastic! Molto bene! Great big universe, packed into my brain. You know you could fix that chameleon circuit if you just tried hotbinding the fragment links and superseding the binary, binary, binary, binary, binary, binary, binary, binary, binary, binary, binary, binary, binary, binary. (gasp) I'm fine. Nah, never mind Felspoon. You know who I'd like to meet? Charlie Chaplin. I bet he's great, Charlie Chaplin. Shall we do that? Shall we go and see Charlie Chaplin? Shall we? Charlie Chaplin? Charlie Chester. Charlie Brown. No, he's fiction. Friction, fiction, fixing, mixing, Rickston, Brixton.
(This time it hurts.)
DONNA: Oh, my God.
DOCTOR: Do you know what's happening?
DONNA: Yeah.
DOCTOR: There's never been a human Time Lord metacrisis before now. And you know why.
DONNA: Because there can't be. I want to stay.
DOCTOR: Look at me. Donna, look at me.
DONNA: I was going to be with you forever.
DOCTOR: I know.
DONNA: The rest of my life, travelling in the Tardis. The Doctor Donna. No. Oh my god. I can't go back. Don't make me go back. Doctor, please, please don't make me go back.
DOCTOR: Donna. Oh, Donna Noble. I am so sorry. But we had the best of times.
DONNA: No.
DOCTOR: The best. Goodbye.
DONNA: No, no, no. Please. Please. No. No.
(The Doctor mind melds with Donna and takes her memories away.)
DONNA: No!
(Donna passes out.)
....
....
....
DOCTOR: She took my mind into her own head. But that's a Time Lord consciousness. All that knowledge, it was killing her.
WILF: But she'll get better now?
DOCTOR: I had to wipe her mind completely. Every trace of me, or the Tardis, anything we did together, anywhere we went, had to go.
WILF: All those wonderful things she did.
DOCTOR: I know. But that version of Donna is dead. Because if she remembers, just for a second, she'll burn up. You can never tell her. You can't mention me or any of it for the rest of her life.




So the Doctor-Donna couldn’t deal with having the Doctor’s mind in her brain.



But the human Doctor born out of meta-crisis earlier in the same episode never showed any kind of insanity till the end, and The Doctor also wasn't worried about that. He was talking about spending his life with Rose.



The meta-crisis Doctor had human brain, and he possessed a Time Lord consciousness with the entire knowledge of The Doctor.



Why wasn't he affected in the same, or any, way?



Update:
My mistake that I didn't realize meta-crisis Doctor was a hybrid, but Doctor-Donna was also a hybrid. In the episode The End of Time, The Master transformed all humans into himself, but Doctor-Donna wasn't affected.



Update 2:
To prove that Donna was really a hybrid, here's quote from Journey's End:




DALEKS: Exterminate. Exterminate. Exterminate.
(Donna works more controls on the panel.)
DALEK: Weapons non-functional.
DONNA: Phwor. Macrotransmission of a K-filter wavelength blocking Dalek weaponry in a self-replicating energy blindfold matrix.
DOCTOR: How did you work that out? You're
NEW DOCTOR: Time Lord. Part Time Lord.
DONNA: Part human. Oh, yes. That was a two-way biological metacrisis. Half Doctor, half Donna.
DOCTOR: The Doctor Donna. Just like the Ood said, remember? They saw it coming. The Doctor Donna.


Monday, 30 May 2016

ag.algebraic geometry - Fields of definition of a variety

Yes, if varieties are interpreted as subvarieties closed subschemes of base extensions of a fixed ambient variety scheme (e.g., affine space or projective space).



More precisely, suppose that $k subseteq F$ are fields and the variety $X$ is an $F$-subvariety a closed subscheme of $mathbf{P}^n_F$. Say for a field $K$ with $k subseteq K subseteq F$ that "$X$ is defined over $K$" if $X$ is the base extension of some subvariety of $mathbf{P}^n_K$. Then $X$ has a minimal field of definition $E$ with $k subseteq E subseteq F$, characterized by the property that for any field $K$ with $k subseteq K subseteq F$, we have that $X$ is defined over $K$ if and only if $K$ contains $E$.



The same statement holds if $mathbf{P}^n$ is replaced by any fixed $k$-variety $k$-scheme $Y$.



(Note: this answer does not contradict Pete's. This is just a different interpretation of the question.)



EDIT: As Brian points out, I was indeed assuming that my varieties were closed in the ambient space. The statement about minimal field of definition is not even true for open subschemes in characteristic $p$. For example, if $k=mathbb{F}_p$ and $F=k(t)$ and $Y=operatorname{Spec} k[x]$ and $X=operatorname{Spec} F[x,1/(x-t)]$, then $X$ is the base extension of $operatorname{Spec} F^{p^n}[x,1/(x^{p^n}-t^{p^n})]$, and hence is definable over $F^{p^n}$ for all $n$, but not over the intersection of all these fields, which is just $k$.



On the other hand, the intersection of any finite number of fields of definition is still a field of definition.



I have generalized to schemes as suggested by Brian.

star trek - In TNG novels, how did this key character leapfrog another for promotion?

From Memory Alpha




Riker is promoted to Admiral in the Star Trek: The Fall miniseries, as Fleet Admiral Leonard James Akaar suspected a conspiracy in the upper echelons of Starfleet Command and needed someone in the admiralty that he knew he could trust. Despite his new position, Riker retains the Titan as his flagship, and attempts to go on missions in it whenever he can.




It seems his promotion was directly related to Fleet Admiral Leonard James Akaar and may not have been entirely on merit. Although he was clearly allowed to retain this rank later (Takedown). Remember that Thomas Riker stated their original goal was to obtain admiral by the age of 30. So becoming an admiral has always been an ambition of Riker's.



Picard may not want to be promoted to Admiral because of his love of commanding the Enterprise




Mere months after taking command, Picard was offered a promotion to commandant of Starfleet Academy with the rank of admiral by Admiral Gregory Quinn, but turned it down to retain command of the Enterprise.




And remember what Captain Kirk said to him:




Don't let them promote you. Don't let them transfer you. Don't let them do anything that takes you off the bridge of that ship, because while you're there... you can make a difference.


A song of fire and Ice: Name of a bastards child?

For lack of tangible proof of "rules" of naming (at least so far), I am going to resort to examples to try to answer this question:



Case 1: The bastard is female, and marries a nobleman.



The female takes the man's name (if she chooses) and so the children take the man's name.
(currently seeking an example of this, closest case is Raynald Westerling
promised wedding to a Lannister bastard, however the marriage didn't occur because, well Raynald died.)



Case 2: The bastard is male, and marries a highborn woman.



The children take the father's name, which would be the regional bastard name.
This can be illustrated by the case of Walder Rivers, who married a Charlton noblewoman - his children Aemon and Walda both remained Rivers.
Despite keeping the bastard name, they may be intent on maintaining reminders of their noble status - for instance, Walder Rivers has his own variation of the Frey coat of arms.



Case 3: A noble bastard marries a lowborn.



Now if a noble's bastard marries a non-noble, their children still have bastard names even though technically they aren't bastards. The inheritance of the bastard name is an indication that they are both of noble lineage, but not in line to inherit in any way.
This is the case with Aemon Rivers.



In cases 2 and 3, the legitimate children may choose to alter their surname to reflect their legitimate status.
For example, House Longwaters is descended from Jon Waters, a Targaryen bastard. Jon Waters' legitimate son changed his surname from the inherited bastard name Waters to Longwaters.



Case 4: Lowborn bastard marries a lowborn.



Generally, lowborn folk don't even bother with surnames.
For example, Ser Duncan the Tall doesn't even know his own name (although his example is a bit extreme).
But some don't bother, because it doesn't mean anything anyway, so either they take a name of their choosing or not.



P.S.: All the bastards in question here are have obviously not been legitimized.

Enumeration of graphs arising in invariant theory

I've been working on a talk based on some stuff in Olver's "Classical Invariant Theory" book and have been wondering about a related graph enumeration problem.



Start with a triple $(n,v,e)$ of natural numbers. Take all $mathbb{Q}$-linear combinations of directed graphs (allowing multiple edges, but no loops) with $v$ vertices, $e$ edges, and each vertex has at most $n$ edges going to it or coming from it. Now, take three relations (images scanned from Olver)



Rule 1: alt text



Rule 2: alt text



Rule 3: alt text



Where the function $v$ with a vertex as subscript next to a graph means that graph multiplied by $n$ minus the number of edges attached to that vertex. (So, for instance, an isolated vertex gets multiplied by $n$)



Denote the space after quotienting by these relations by $V_{n,v,e}$. And so, in final form, my question:




What is $dim V_{n,v,e}$? Or at least, can we find relatively effective upper bounds?




EDIT: Some clarifications. The colorings on the vertices are just to mark them in the pictures to keep track of where everything goes, the graphs are not marked themselves. Additionally, as Rule 2 is slightly unclear from the scan, the $v$ function is always the vertex not attached to the arrow in the configuration.

A single word for someone who spends their wealth very foolishly

What is a single word for someone who spends their wealth very foolishly?



For example: A person is obligated to take care of their children but instead spends their money on unnecessary things leaving no money to provide the necessary things for their children like food and clothes.

harry potter - Did the Peverell brothers attend Hogwarts?

The three brothers were born after Hogwarts School of Witchcraft and Wizardry was founded. They are related to Slytherin by marriage (their descendants married) but that does not indicate they actually attended the school.



Ignotus Peverell and his brothers were knowledgable in magical arts but there is no actual proof whether the Peverell brothers attended Hogwarts School of Witchcraft and Wizardry, were home-schooled or learned about the magical arts on their own, autodidactically.



I'd ask J.K. Rowling. You might get lucky?

magical creatures - How did Dobby intercept Harry's mail?

How did Dobby the house-elf intercept Harry's mail during Harry's summer holiday between Philosopher's Stone and Chamber of Secrets?




‘See what it’s like here?’ [Harry] said. ‘See why I’ve got to go back to Hogwarts? It’s the only place I’ve got – well, I think I’ve got friends.’

‘Friends who don’t even write to Harry Potter?’ said Dobby slyly.

‘I expect they’ve just been – hang on,’ said Harry, frowning. ‘How do you know my friends haven’t been writing to me?’

Dobby shuffled his feet. ‘Harry Potter mustn’t be angry with Dobby – Dobby did it for
the best...’

Have you been stopping my letters?’

‘Dobby has them here, sir,’ said the elf.

Chamber of Secrets - page 19 - UK - chapter 2, Dobby's Warning




I saw a similar topic at another Q&A site while I was looking for a JKR interview link and thought this question might be a good fit for SE. I hadn't thought about it before, but it does seem like tracking Harry's mail would be a full time job that would've pulled Dobby away from his indentured servitude for the Malfoys. How did he manage it?

harry potter - How Did Tom Riddle Find Out About the Existence/Location of the Chamber of Secrets?

Corvinus Gaunt himself know the actual entrance to the Chamber of Secrets and has been a student of Hogwarts.



But instead of opening the Chamber he decided to hide it in the girls toilet at the time toilets were established at Hogwarts. The theory that the basilisk was actually an anti muggle defense is in fact great but has a little problem, only a wizard could see the castle.



But I think Salazar Slytherin was actually using old roman water technology of aqueduct when he created the Chamber of Secrets. So I think the Chamber was originally located under a fountain and Corvinus changed this.



Living about the time of 1700 Corvinus Gaunt had a clear problem to create the modification he need a clear excuse. And what better excuse could be if he said that he has been told about a monster in Hogwarts , but knows about a secret Chamber. So he could use the entrance in the girls bathroom actually as an excuse to lock the creature in her secret Chamber. Thats how he could know about the entrance and create the legend but could not open the Chamber.



But the second Parselmouth after Salazar Slytherin was eventually forgotten and no other Gaunt ever attended Hogwarts. Then Tom Marvolo Riddle probably found during his school time a text from Corvinus.Tom Riddle still needed six years to find the Chamber.



The rest is no problem telling the basilisk to close its eyes and bring it under Tom's Imperius Curse.



The case with Ginny Weasley is a simple one too. Under Trance by the Horcrux, the Horcrux simply uses Ginny's body but ordered the Basilisk as a living Tom would do.



Harry's cases is more complicated. At first there are the two Horcrux the Diary and Harry, but the Riddle Horcrux acted like the living Riddle allowing Harry to enter. What Voldemort would not know is that probably all the defense spells which stop others from entering the Chamber were actually bound with the Basilisk.So he lowered them for Harry to enter, but Harry simply destroyed the spells that shield the Chamber by killing the Basilisk. If the Basilisk was dead anyone could enter who speak parselmouth even without knowledge of what it sounds like.



Dumbledore could have tried to have Morfin Gaunt released from Azkaban. Maybe Morfin not only shows Dumbledore his past but also writes for him texts to understand parselmouth in order to help Dumbledore defeating Voldemort. That's
why Dumbledore knows what Morfin says, but probably refused to use it by himself

grammar - I have seen/saw her this morning

The present perfect tense requires use of a non-specific time; this morning, grammatically speaking, is a specific time (as is yesterday, last week, last year, and in 1947), and therefore you must use the present simple tense (I saw her this morning), regardless of what time it is now. However, you could say, "I have seen her since this morning," which creates a non-specific window of time between this morning and now in which she was seen (and yes, you could say this at 10am and it would still be correct).

Verbs that change meaning depending on object position

Labels for words matters. The two verbs in your example are "slipped" and "threw".



Up can be an adverb (I was sick and vomited up everything), a preposition (They took a cruise up the Rhine), an adjective (the mood here is resolutely up), a noun (You can't have ups all the time in football), etc.



In your first example, up is an adverb (a word or phrase that modifies or qualifies an adjective, verb, or other adverb). In your second, it is according to @Edwin Asworth, also an adverb. Please see below. However, if one presumes she threw her keys up into the air, it could be considered a preposition.



Also, in (Ame at least) English, throw up means to vomit, so that threw up her keys will first strike someone as a bit awkward, although in context it will be understood as it is meant to be.



Edited to reflect @Edwin Ashworth's information.

auxiliary verbs - Use of Do/Does with indefinite pronouns

I am new!



We all know that we use does with third-person singular (noun or pronoun, (definite or indefinite), but I am really confused about two things:



  1. How can I know that the given indefinite pronoun is used on behalf of a third person singular?


  2. Why is it that we write "do" with the indefinite pronoun "any" but not with "anyone"?


I have already checked many forums, but I am not content with them as all of them tell only "What to do" and not "Why to do".



I am sure that I am going to have satisfactory answers now.

Sunday, 29 May 2016

A word describing a person who doesn't overcomplicate things?

Perhaps results-oriented, frank, direct, or candid fit the bill?




"Delivered project milestone ahead of schedule; used frank, candid feedback to engage stakeholders"




In a similar vein by way of resume-related words... albeit as a tangent to this specific request, I would also suggest the related notions behind initiative or self-starter. (Of course, assuming those are qualities you embody.)

star trek tng - Was Voyager really significantly slower than the Enterprise-D?

Simple answer: the writers messed up badly.
As far as I can tell, if the 'just over 300 years' line is accurate for the Enterprise D at Warp 9.2 to travel through 2.7 million light-years... that amounts to about 41.2 Ly's per 25 and a half hours (or just under 1 day in Trek universe - they have a 26 hour day then).



If we take this as an estimate of how fast Warp 9.2 actually is in the late 24th century (which DOES make sense btw), and if we take into account that per Trek itself, after warp 9, each point (or every 0.1 increase) would yield exponential increase in speed, and past Warp 9.9, the closer you get to TW threshold (Warp 10), again, exponential increases ensue with every (0.01) addition.
So, theoretically:



Warp 9.2 = 41.2 Ly's in just under a day.



Warp 9.3 = 82.4 Ly's in just under a day.



Warp 9.4 = 164.8 Ly's in just under a day.



Warp 9.5 = 329.6 Ly's -//-



Warp 9.6 = 659.2 Ly's -//-



Warp 9.7 = 1318.4 Ly's -//-



Warp 9.8 = 2636.8 Ly's -//-



Warp 9.9 = 5273.6 Ly's -//-



Warp 9.91 = 10547.2 Ly's -//-



Warp 9.92 = 21094.4 Ly's -//-



Warp 9.93 = 42188.8 Ly's -//-



Warp 9.94 = 84377.6 Ly's -//-



Warp 9.95 = 168755.2 Ly's -//-



Warp 9.96 = 337510.4 Ly's -//-



Warp 9.97 = 675020.8 Ly's -//-



Voyager's 'top cruising speed' was stated to be Warp 9.975
Top cruising speeds indicate a sustainable velocity an engine can take without refuelling or stops.
For Voyager, Warp 9.98 or 9.99 for example would be 'sustainable for only 12 hours'.



But hey, even if 9.975 was sustainable for only 12 hours... Voyager would traverse 75 000 Ly's in about 2 and a half hours at that speed.
And if that messup of 'Threshold' episode is taken into account, Voyager cannot even approach 9.975 before beginning to fall apart. Chakotay ordered a reduction to 9.5 0 which would still mean Voyager would need about 9 to 10 months to get back to Earth.



Mind, you, if Warp factors double past Warp 9.9 for each incremental increase (0.01), that would mean that Voyager at Warp 9.97 would cross through about 5273.6 Ly's in just under 1 day (probably closer to, or exceeding 6000 Ly's per day when you factor in the small 0.1 increases I didn't take into account).
So, Voyager would need about 14 and a half days to get back to Federation space with 5273.6 Ly's crossed each day... and about 12.5 days if its 6000 Ly's per day.



Voyager's writers placed its Warp 9.975 top cruising speed to equate the Warp scale of Kirk's era it would seem.
There is a solution to this particular issue:
It could have been explained that the Caretaker's pull into the DQ damaged the warp drive to such a degree where the crew had to 'redefine' the Warp scale themselves to the previous Warp scale until such a time came when they could repair the engines.
Each new year of the series could have began with the crew making series of repairs that increased their top sustainable Warp speed.
They could have done that so that the ship would return to Federation space under its own power in 7 years without external help or shortcuts of any kind.



Small note: Federation ships in the 24th century are equipped with plethora of tecnologies that would allow them to be completely self sufficient.
For instance: Voyager could have stopped in any un-inhabited star system, and used solar power to power its replicators.
Since replicators convert energy into matter, they could have easily replicated parts of industrial grade replicators and even antimatter (since they wouldn't be drawing from the ship itself), or they could have used this energy input to synthesize omicron particles which could have been used to boost antimatter reserves, and subsequently build more torpedoes.
Transporters could have been used to dematerialize large chunks of asteroids and re-arrange their molecular structure into what was needed.
Remember that all matter in the universe incorporates base materials, and asteroids are chock-full of raw matter. Just play about with the molecular bonds until you create what you need.
We already do it in real life and its actually automated, for the Feds in the 24th century, that kind of tinkering would be automated and perfected to such a degree that they would be way past that.



And seeing how Voyager could have been said to have been the ONLY ship in the fleet to sport these new engines (thanks to it being state of the art and all), there's your issue of them being unable to get support from the Federation any time soon.
That still leaves the problem of subspace communications being much faster... in which case, a message would get back home in about 14 months... but I guess a delay of that kind would have been acceptable for this series (wouldn't do them too much good because they couldn't expect SF to send any ships with retrofitted engines to their aid until after they initially got the message - so that would still leave the ship unsupported for at least the first year and a few months time).



Tons of ideas and missed opportunities could have been used.
Mind you, I do like Voyager, but I felt it was too dumbed down in various areas for a technologically advanced civilization that is supposedly way past us.
For the love of Humanity, even back in 1995 when Voyager first aired, we had the technological abilities that would put a shame to a lot of what Trek did by then.

music identification - What is the song playing in The walking dead S2e5 when daryl pulls the arrow out and in s3e10 when daryl and merle help the mexicans?

What you are talking about is not a song, but rather a musical cue. See, the Walking Dead is scored by one Bear McCreary. The only possible name that I could find for it comes from this forum post which refers to it as Daryls theme/Dream tones. Luckily, he wrote a whole blog post talking about what he was hoping to accomplish and embedded a nice video showing how he came up with the sounds you heard.



However, that particular piece of music hasn't been rerecorded anywhere I could find, so I can't link you to a place to buy it. Of course, it's not the only place he uses those tribal style drums in his music, so if you cruise through some more of his work, you will probably find some stuff that speaks to you just as much!

star trek - Why didn’t Voyager fly to the end of the Bajoran wormhole in the Gamma Quadrant?

Three errors made by some posters here:



One:



The Gamma Quadrant exit of the Bajoran wormhole has a very specific location. Space is very, very transparent. You can see objects that are billions of light years away, unless you are looking through the dust clouds near the plane of the galactic disc. The Galaxy has over 100 globular star clusters that surround it in all directions - most of them are not obscured by galactic dust clouds.



Measuring the angles to three or more globular clusters would be enough to measure the position of the Gamma Quadrant exit of the Bajoran wormhole very precisely, and it would have been done many times, at least once by each science ship that passed through it. And Voyager would have measured its position near the Ocampa Array from observations of globular star clusters.



According to the Voyager pilot episode "Caretaker", just about a minute after being transported to the Ocampa Array Ensign Kim says:




KIM: Captain, if these sensors are working, we're over seventy thousand light years from where we were. We're on the other side of the galaxy.




So obviously starship sensors can measure positions very rapidly.



http://www.chakoteya.net/Voyager/101.htm



If Janeway wanted to head for the Gamma Quadrant exit of the Bajoran wormhole they could have plotted a very precise course toward it.



Two:



The Dominion did not rule the volume of space that included the Gamma Quadrant exit of the Bajoran wormhole.



DS9 made contact with various space travelers that come through the Bajoran Wormhole in the first season and into the second season and none of them mentioned that they were subjects of the mighty Dominion and the Federation better stay on good terms with the Dominion.



Obviously the Dominion border must have been tens, hundreds, or thousands of light years away from the Gamma Quadrant exit of the Bajoran wormhole.



The Dominion ordered the Federation to stay out of the Gamma Quadrant and the Federation ignored their warning. The Federation obviously considered the space traveling realms that were closer to the Gamma Quadrant exit of the Bajoran wormhole to have more right to control who used it than the Dominion did.



If the Dominion ruled the space that included the Gamma Quadrant exit of the Bajoran wormhole they could have and would have simply stationed a war fleet by the mouth of the wormhole to blast each and every starship that came out of the mouth of the wormhole. But they didn't.



Three:



By the time that Voyager was lost in the Delta Quadrant the Federation probably already had rough maps of the size and location of the Dominion. The Dominion probably didn't keep its borders secret. Thus Voyager could have plotted a course that took it past Dominion space and turned back to come to the Gamma Quadrant exit of the Bajoran wormhole from the direction opposite to the Dominion and least likely to be conquered by the Dominion.

grammar - Dependent clause after pronoun

This question arose from why sentence #1 is correct and why sentence #2 is incorrect -




I pity those who lost their money in gambling.



I pity them who lost their money in gambling.




I have asked the question in ELL forum, as well as in Linguistics forum.



But the answers their made me more confused.



RULE 1




Jlawler's comment contains the direct answer to the question. Definite personal pronouns (I/me, you, he/him, she/her, it, we/us,
they/them) cannot take a restrictive modifier. In other words, they
cannot take a dependent that narrows the set of entities that they
denote. This trait of personal pronouns underlies their use as test
words for constituent structure. For example:



 (a)  The man with the hat knows the woman with the scarf.

(b) He knows her.

(c) *He with the hat knows her with the scarf.


Sentence (a) is the starting sentence. Sentence (b) shows proform
substitution; the personal pronouns he and her have been
substituted in for the noun phrases the man with the hat and the
woman with the scarf
. Based on the acceptability of sentence (b), one
concludes that both the man with the hat and the woman with the
scarf
are constituents. Definite pronouns such as he and her (and
them) take the place of constituents, in this case of complete noun phrases.



The unacceptability of sentence (c) reveals that the strings the man
and the woman in (a) are not constituents. In other words, the
definite personal pronouns he and her cannot take dependents
(=modifiers), since they necessarily replace an entire noun phrase.
This fact explains why them who lost their money in the question is
bad English. The relative clause who lost money is a postdependent
(=postmodifier), and as such it cannot modify them (because them
as a definite personal pronoun cannot be modified).



The plural demonstrative pronouns (these and those) behave
differently. They can take postdepndents (=postmodifiers, i.e. a
modifier that follows them), e.g



 (d)  These with hats know those with scarves. 


This is simply a trait of the plural demonstrative pronouns (these
and those) -- there is no good explanation why plural demonstrative
pronouns behave differently than definite personal pronouns; they
simply do. Note that the plural demonstrative pronouns also behave
differently than the singular demonstrative pronouns in this regard,
e.g.



 (e)  *This with a hat knows that with a scarf.


Singular demonstrative pronouns (this and that) are behaving like
the definite personal pronouns; they cannot take dependents.



The combination plural demonstrative pronoun + restrictive relative
clause
can actually be viewed as a particular construction in
English and related languages. That is, it is a combination that
occurs relatively frequently and has therefore been lexicalized.
German has a very similar construction, e.g.



 (f) Diejenigen mit einem Hut kennen diejenigen mit einem Schal. 
those with a hat know those with a scarf.


By acknowledging that one has a particular construction, one is in a
sense admitting that there is no real grammatical "explanation" for
the phenomenon. It simply exists.



Finally, note that there are certain apparent exceptions to the
principles mentioned above. There are uses of personal pronouns that
actually allow modification, e.g.



 (g) He who studies a lot gets a good grade. 


In this example, the personal pronoun he is not referring directly
to a specific entity, which means it is not definite; it is, rather,
being used as an indefinite pronoun; it means 'the one, anyone', e.g.
Anyone who studies a lot gets a good grade.




MY CONFUSION



Reading this answer make the following sentence consider wrong -




It is she who stood second in class.




So another person came up with another rule -



RULE 2




Nominative personal pronouns can be modified by relative clauseas just
like demonstrative pronouns; it's the objective personal pronouns that
can't. He who, she who, they who, you who are all grammatical, if
archaic. Him who, her who, them who, however, aren't.




MY CONFUSION



Now this rule create a conflict with the rule 1 I quoted first. In the first rule it says - He with the hat knows her with the scarf - sentence is wrong, but if we consider the second rule then this particular sentence should be correct.



Another problem with the second rule is that it makes the following sentence incorrect -




The action was performed by her who is the secretary of XYZ company.




So another rule came in picture -



RULE 3




"Them," combined with the "who," has to be used with a preposition
like "to," "from," or "with."



"I pity them," by itself, is a grammatically correct sentence, but
when you connect the dependent clause with "who," it is no longer
correct.




Now I am really confused. Can anyone here please help?

Saturday, 28 May 2016

word choice - Is there are term for when you believe that because something hasn't happened, it won't or can't happen?

I was having a conversation with someone about whether or not robotics and AI will cause problems by eliminating jobs. They said:



"People worried about joblessness when we started to mechanize farms, their worries never panned out, therefore your worries now are misplaced."



Or to use another example:



"The last big asteroid that came close to earth didn't crash into us, therefore we'll never be hit by one ever."



Without any justification as to why the two situations are similar this line of thinking seems like it is a fallacy. If so, what is the name for it? If not is there any other word or term that describes the line of thinking?

pr.probability - Are all probabilities conditional probabilities?

In the hope of soliciting an expert opinion rather than offering one (I am neither a probabilist nor a logician), let me bring up here the topic of logical probability. Jan Lukasiewicz came up with infinitely valued propositional logic (with values in the interval $[0,1]$), which he also viewed as a way of formalizing probability, addressing the problem of interpreting conditional probabilities as well. According to Wikipedia, Richard Threlkeld Cox later showed that any extension of Aristotelian logic to incorporate truth values between 0 and 1, in order to be consistent, must be equivalent to Bayesian probability (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cox%27s_theorem). Cox's axioms deal with the notion of plausibility of a proposition A given a proposition B.



Added: this is the relevant paper by Lukasiewicz: Die logischen Grundlagen der Wahrscheinlichkeitsrechnung, Kraków, Polska Akademia Umiejętności, 1913 English translation in Selected Works, ed. by L. Borkowski, Amsterdam-London, North-
Holland Publishing Company/Warsaw, PWN, 1970, pp. 16-63

grammaticality - Is this an appropriate usage of "but" at the beginning of a sentence?

Your example sentence has but for, which is a preposition, not a conjunction. So none of the so-called rules prohibiting starting sentences with a conjunction apply.



As the comments here and other answers to similar questions make clear, there are times when it is absolutely the best choice to start a sentence with a coordinating conjunction such as and, but, or.



Language Log has an excellent article on this, which contains the following text:




There is nothing in the grammar of the English language to support a
prescription against starting a sentence with and or but --- nothing
in the norms of speaking and nothing in the usage of the best writers
over the entire history of the literary language. Like all languages,
English is full of mechanisms to promote coherence by linking a
sentence with its discourse context, and on any sensible evaluation,
this is a Good Thing. Whoever invented the rule against
sentence-initial and and but, with its preposterous justification in
terms of an alleged defect in sentential "completeness", must have had
a tin ear and a dull mind. Nevertheless, this stupid made-up rule has
infected the culture so thoroughly that 60% of the AHD's (sensible and
well-educated) usage panel accepts it to some degree.




People who have internalised such zombie rules (Language Log) from school have maybe suffered from teachers who applied the "If they do it too much, they must be told not to do it at all" syndrome. In other words, elementary school students are told never to start a sentence with and to preclude typical narratives that are a string of "And then I did this ... And then I did that ... ." This is what people tend to remember, and not the more nuanced discussion that takes places (should take place) in high school English class.



Again, there is a helpful discussion of the above syndrome on Language Log.



As an aside, because is a subordinating conjunction, and there is never a problem starting a sentence with a subordinating conjunction, as long as the clause it begins is followed by a main clause - otherwise you have a sentence fragment. But, again, there is no prohibition on writing fragments. Because they can be the most effective way to make your point.

doctor who - Why did Daleks invade Earth after stealing it?

The Earth is a well known hub of anti-Dalek activity. Note that their primary targets seem to be facilities and locations that have shown an ability to defend the Earth against alien assaults in previous serials:



  • Unit HQ

  • The Valiant

  • Torchwood

  • New York (HQ of the United Nations)

  • London (the site of the Torchwood anti-Sycorax weapon seen in "The Christmas Invasion")


They expend a considerable amount of time looking for the Doctor




DAVROS : I mean, is there news of him?



SUPREME DALEK : Negative! No reports of Time Lord. We are beyond the Doctor's reach!





They also need to "harvest" a considerable number of humans (including Jackie, Mickey and Rose) to test their destructo-ray on.

grammar - Are stative verbs always inchoative when used with an imperative?

The use of the term 'inchoative aspect' in the post deserves special admiration. Before we move on to the larger issue, let us examine the terms, ASPECT, STATIVE as apposed to DYNAMIC, IMPERATIVE and INCHOATIVE.



ASPECT is difficult to define. Roughly, on a superfluous level, it expresses how an action, event or state denoted by a verb relates to the flow of time. English tense system is made of the stuff of TIME (present/past/future) and ASPECT(simple/continuous/perfect). Time refers to 'when' and ASPECT to 'how'.



Stative verbs describe a state of being/perceiving/mind/relationship. Stative verbs like 'know','believe' or 'love' are static or unchanging through out their entire duration and do not require imput or energy like DYNAMIC (action) VERBS.



Strictly speaking, inchoative verbs are literally those set of verbs that express a state of change, require no causing agent and seem to suggest that something is occurring spontaneously of its own accord. Cf.* The leaves turned brown. However, they have nothing to do with inchoative aspect of our discussion.



Imperative is a sentence type standardly used for the communication of a demand. The speaker desires ACTION expressed in the sentence to take place. When in negative the speaker intends that something shouldn't happen or is not desired.
* Run.
* Do not play in the Sun.



IMPERATIVE VERBS ARE TENSE LESS. Imperative are usually odd with statives. It is believed that they are restricted to dynamic verbs. When stative verbs are used in imperatives the interpretation is ,nevertheless, dynamic.



Interetingly, in English a verb that expresses a state can also express the entrance into a state. This ENTRANCE INTO A STATE /ITS PROBABILITY/CONDITIOAL DESIRABILITY is meant by INCHOATIVE ASPECT. Inchoative is an aspect that expresses the beginning of an event or state of a verb. English does not have a separate form to express the inchoative. But the expression - be about to- is a marker of inchoative meaning.



Dowty gives some test to decide if a verb is stative. One of them says that statives don't occur as imperative unless used in an inchoative manner as we have explained already. Some examples.
* Know Greek by Friday. * Remain seated. * Know that we went yesterday. * Look elated.* Please remember where the money was hidden.



In the above examples, statives are coerced by the imperative mood into dynamic interpretation, or in other words, into inchoative aspect.



It is true that there are forty or so stative verbs and not all of them have an inchoative aspect.



But once it is admitted that stative verbs have inchoative presence in imperatives, it matters little whether the sentence is positive or negative. The verb is inchoative in both:* Love me / Don't remain seated long.
John Lawler nicely explained in his comment what,"Dont think badly of this" is suggestive of. Being negative, it is inchoative as well.



However, day by day the borderline between stative and dynamic is getting blurred. McDonald tweaked standard usage of stative verbs to call attention to itself -"I'm lovin' it." , and the shops post signs saying, "Enjoy your beverages outside." However, Dowty is very much right though.

gr.group theory - How big can the irreps of a finite group be (over an arbitrary field)?

EDIT: Part 4 added. EDIT2: Second proof of Part 4 added.



1. The answer is no (as long as we are working over a field - of any characteristic, algebraically closed or not). If $k$ is a field and $G$ is a finite group, then the dimension of any irreducible representation $V$ of $G$ over $k$ is $leq left|Gright|$. This is actually obvious: Take any nonzero vector $vin V$; then, $kleft[Gright]v$ is a nontrivial subrepresentation of $V$ of dimension $leqdimleft(kleft[Gright]right)=left|Gright|$. Since our representation $V$ was irreducible, this subrepresentation must be $V$, and hence $dim Vleqleft|Gright|$.



2. Okay, we can do a little bit better: Any irreducible representation $V$ of $G$ has dimension $leqleft|Gright|-1$, unless $G$ is the trivial group. Same proof applies, with one additional step:



If $dim V=left|Gright|$, then the map $kleft[Gright]to V, gmapsto gv$ must be bijective (in fact, it is surjective,
since $kleft[Gright]v=V$, and it therefore must be bijective since $dimleft(kleft[Gright]right)=left|Gright|=dim V$), so it is an isomorphism of representations (since it is $G$-equivariant), and thus $Vcong kleft[Gright]$. But $kleft[Gright]$ is not an irreducible representation, unless $G$ is the trivial group (in fact, it always contains the $1$-dimensional trivial representation).



3. Note that if the base field $k$ is algebraically closed and of characteristic $0$, then we can do much better: In this case, an irreducible representation of $G$ always has dimension $<sqrt{left|Gright|}$ (in fact, in this case, the sum of the squares of the dimensions of all irreducible representations is $left|Gright|$, and one of these representations is the trivial $1$-dimensional one). However, if the base field is not necessarily algebraically closed and of arbitrary characteristic, then the bound $dim Vleq left|Gright|-1$ can be sharp (take cyclic groups).



4. There is a way to improve 2. so that it comes a bit closer to 3.:



Theorem 1. If $V_1$, $V_2$, ..., $V_m$ are $m$ pairwise nonisomorphic irreducible representations of a finite-dimensional algebra $A$ over a field $k$ (not necessarily algebraically closed, not necessarily of characteristic $0$), then $dim V_1+dim V_2+...+dim V_mleqdim A$.



(Of course, if $A$ is the group algebra of some finite group $G$, then $dim A=left|Gright|$, and we get 2. as a consequence.)



First proof of Theorem 1. At first, for every $iinleftlbrace 1,2,...,mrightrbrace$, the (left) representation $V_i^{ast}$ of the algebra $A^{mathrm{op}}$ (this representation is defined by $acdot f=left(vmapsto fleft(avright)right)$ for any $fin V_i^{ast}$ and $ain A$) is irreducible (since $V_i$ is irreducible) and therefore isomorphic to a quotient of the regular (left) representation $A^{mathrm{op}}$ (since we can choose some nonzero $uin V_i^{ast}$, and then the map $A^{mathrm{op}}to V_i^{ast}$ given by $amapsto au$ must be surjective, because its image is a nonzero subrepresentation of $V_i^{ast}$ and therefore equal to $V_i^{ast}$ due to the irreducibility of $V_i^{ast}$). Hence, by duality, $V_i$ is isomorphic to a subrepresentation of the (left) representation $A^{mathrm{op}ast}=A^{ast}$ of $A$. Hence, from now on, let's assume that $V_i$ actually is a subrepresentation of $A^{ast}$ for every $iinleftlbrace 1,2,...,mrightrbrace$.



Now, let us prove that the vector subspaces $V_1$, $V_2$, ..., $V_m$ of $A^{ast}$ are linearly disjoint, i. e., that the sum $V_1+V_2+...+V_m$ is actually a direct sum. We will prove this by induction over $m$, so let's assume that the sum $V_1+V_2+...+V_{m-1}$ is already a direct sum. It remains to prove that $V_mcap left(V_1+V_2+...+V_{m-1}right)=0$. In fact, assume the contrary. Then, $V_mcap left(V_1+V_2+...+V_{m-1}right)=V_m$ (since $V_mcap left(V_1+V_2+...+V_{m-1}right)$ is a nonzero subrepresentation of $V_m$, and $V_m$ is irreducible). Thus, $V_msubseteq V_1+V_2+...+V_{m-1}$. Consequently, $V_m$ is isomorphic to a subrepresentation of the direct sum $V_1oplus V_2oplus ...oplus V_{m-1}$ (because the sum $V_1+V_2+...+V_{m-1}$ is a direct sum, according to our induction assumption).



Now, according to Theorem 2.2 and Remark 2.3 of Etingof's "Introduction to representation theory", any subrepresentation of the direct sum $V_1oplus V_2oplus ...oplus V_{m-1}$ must be a direct sum of the form $r_1V_1oplus r_2V_2oplus ...oplus r_{m-1}V_{m-1}$ for some nonnegative integers $r_1$, $r_2$, ..., $r_{m-1}$. Hence, every irreducible subrepresentation of the direct sum $V_1oplus V_2oplus ...oplus V_{m-1}$ must be one of the representations $V_1$, $V_2$, ..., $V_{m-1}$. Since we know that $V_m$ is isomorphic to a subrepresentation of the direct sum $V_1oplus V_2oplus ...oplus V_{m-1}$, we conclude that $V_m$ is isomorphic to one of the representations $V_1$, $V_2$, ..., $V_{m-1}$. This contradicts the non-isomorphy of the representations $V_1$, $V_2$, ..., $V_m$. Thus, we have proven that the sum $V_1+V_2+...+V_m$ is actually a direct sum. Consequently, $dim V_1+dim V_2+...+dim V_m=dimleft(V_1+V_2+...+V_mright)leq dim A^{ast}=dim A$, and Theorem 1 is proven.



Second proof of Theorem 1. I just learnt the following simpler proof of Theorem 1 from §1 Lemma 1 in Crawley-Boevey's "Lectures on representation theory and invariant theory":



Let $0=A_0subseteq A_1subseteq A_2subseteq ...subseteq A_k=A$ be a composition series of the regular representation $A$ of $A$. Then, by the definition of a composition series, for every $iin leftlbrace 1,2,...,krightrbrace$, the representation $A_i/A_{i-1}$ of $A$ is irreducible.



Let $T$ be an irreducible representation of $A$. We are going to prove that there exists some $Iin leftlbrace 1,2,...,krightrbrace$ such that $Tcong A_I/A_{I-1}$ (as representations of $A$).



In fact, let $I$ be the smallest element $iin leftlbrace 1,2,...,krightrbrace$ satisfying $A_iTneq 0$ (such elements $i$ exist, because $A_kT=AT=Tneq 0$). Then, $A_ITneq 0$, but $A_{I-1}T=0$. Now, choose some vector $tin T$ such that $A_Itneq 0$ (such a vector $t$ exists, because $A_ITneq 0$), and consider the map $f:A_Ito T$ defined by $fleft(aright)=at$ for every $ain A_I$. Then, this map $f$ is a homomorphism of representations of $A$. Since it maps the subrepresentation $A_{I-1}$ to $0$ (because $fleft(A_{I-1}right)=A_{I-1}tsubseteq A_{I-1}T=0$), it gives rise to a map $g:A_I/A_{I-1}to T$, which, of course, must also be a homomorphism of representations of $A$. Since $A_I/A_{I-1}$ and $T$ are irreducible representations of $A$, it follows from Schur's lemma that any homomorphism of representations from $A_I/A_{I-1}$ to $T$ is either an isomorphism or identically zero. Hence, $g$ is either an isomorphism or identically zero. But $g$ is not identically zero (since $gleft(A_I/A_{I-1}right)=fleft(A_Iright)=A_Itneq 0$), so that $g$ must be an isomorphism, i. e., we have $Tcong A_I/A_{I-1}$.



So we have just proven that



(1) For every irreducible representation $T$ of $A$, there exists some $Iin leftlbrace 1,2,...,krightrbrace$ such that $Tcong A_I/A_{I-1}$ (as representations of $A$).



Denote this $I$ by $I_T$ in order to make it clear that it depends on $T$. So we have $Tcong A_{I_T}/A_{I_T-1}$ for each irreducible representation $T$ of $A$. Applying this to $T=V_i$ for every $iinleftlbrace 1,2,...,mrightrbrace$, we see that $V_icong A_{I_{V_i}}/A_{I_{V_i}-1}$ for every $iinleftlbrace 1,2,...,mrightrbrace$. Hence, the elements $I_{V_1}$, $I_{V_2}$, ..., $I_{V_m}$ of the set $leftlbrace 1,2,...,krightrbrace$ are pairwise distinct (because $I_{V_i}=I_{V_j}$ would yield $V_icong A_{I_{V_i}}/A_{I_{V_i}-1}=A_{I_{V_j}}/A_{I_{V_j}-1}cong V_j$, but the representations $V_1$, $V_2$, ..., $V_m$ are pairwise nonisomorphic), and thus



$sumlimits_{i=1}^{m}dimleft(A_{I_{V_i}}/A_{I_{V_i}-1}right)=sumlimits_{substack{jinleftlbrace 1,2,...,krightrbrace ; \ text{there exists }\ iinleftlbrace 1,2,...,mrightrbrace \ text{ such that }j=I_{V_i}}}dimleft(A_j/A_{j-1}right)$
$leq sumlimits_{jinleftlbrace 1,2,...,krightrbrace}dimleft(A_j/A_{j-1}right)$ (since $dimleft(A_j/A_{j-1}right)geq 0$ for every $j$, so that adding more summands cannot decrease the sum)
$=sumlimits_{j=1}^{k}dimleft(A_j/A_{j-1}right)=sumlimits_{j=1}^{k}left(dim A_j-dim A_{j-1}right)$.



Since $dimleft(A_{I_{V_i}}/A_{I_{V_i}-1}right)=dim V_i$ for each $i$ (due to $A_{I_{V_i}}/A_{I_{V_i}-1}cong V_i$) and $sumlimits_{j=1}^{k}left(dim A_j-dim A_{j-1}right)=dim A$ (in fact, the sum $sumlimits_{j=1}^{k}left(dim A_j-dim A_{j-1}right)$ is a telescopic sum and simplifies to $dim A_k-dim A_0=dim A-dim 0=dim A-0=dim A$), this inequality becomes $sumlimits_{i=1}^{m}dim V_ileqdim A$. This proves Theorem 1.

story identification - Wood nymph (otik style) who becomes a scientist

I am trying to hunt down a book I read in the 90s and lost some time ago. It starts with some children wandering in a wood, and they encounter a wood nymph creature that starts following them around. Eventually, the wood nymph becomes accepted, and starts to live with humans. The more time he spends with them, the more human he becomes. There is an incident where he cuts off his finger as a party trick expecting it to grow back, but instead it bleeds because he is not made of wood any more.



So he starts to live as a human, except he does not age at the same rate and he lives for hundreds of years. Eventually, he becomes an alchemist, although I forget the purpose of his experiments. Finally, after a few hundred years, he walks into his garden and plants himself, and becomes a tree.



Does anyone have any ideas?

grammar - Is "he plays the piano" stative or dynamic?

"He plays the piano" can be stative, when for example, it is being used to state a fact:




A: Does he have any hobbies?
B: He plays the piano.




Here, "He plays the piano" is stative.



"He plays the piano" can be dynamic, when describing someone actually doing it:




He rises, goes to the piano, gravely sits down, then, plays the piano.




"he plays the piano" in this context, is dynamic.

Multiplicative structure on spectral sequence

This is an expansion of John Rognes' answer. I have filled in a few details in Douady's seminare notes and noticed that one gets away with slightly weaker axioms. If there is already a reliable reference for all this, please let me know.



Recall that a Cartan-Eilenberg system $(H,eta,partial)$ (see here, chapter XV.7) consists of modules $H(p,q)$ for each $ple q$, morphisms $etacolon H(p',q')to H(p,q)$ for all $ple p'$, $qle q'$, and boundary morphisms $partialcolon H(p,q) to H(q,r)$ for all $ple qle r$, such that



  1. $eta=mathrm{id}colon H(p,q)to H(p,q)$,


  2. $eta=etacircetacolon H(p'',q'')to H(p',q')to H(p,q)$,


  3. $eta$ and $partial$ commute,


  4. there are long exact sequences $cdotsto H(q,r)stackreletato H(p,r)stackreletato H(p,q)stackrelpartialto H(q,r)tocdots$.


The conditions needed for convergence have been omitted. A typical example is $H(p,q)=tilde h_bullet(X_p/X_q)$, where $cdotssupset X_{-1}supset X_0supset X_1supsetcdots$ is a decreasing sequence of cofibrations and $tilde h_bullet$ is some generalised homology theory. The grading is suppressed in the following, but you can easily fill it in.



To set up a spectral sequence from $(H,eta,partial)$, one defines
$$Z^r_p=mathrm{im}bigl(H(p,p+r)stackreletato H(p,p+1)bigr);,$$
$$B^r_p=mathrm{im}bigl(H(p-r+1,p)stackrelpartialto H(p,p+1)bigr);,$$
$$E^r_p=Z^r_p/B^r_p;,$$
$$d^r_pcolon Z^r_p/B^r_ptwoheadrightarrow Z^r_p/Z^{r+1}_pcong
B^{r+1}_{p+r}/B^r_{p+r}hookrightarrow Z^r_{p+r}/B^r_{p+r};.$$
Details are in Switzer's book, chapter 15. In particular
$$ker(d^r_p)=Z^{r+1}_p/B^r_pqquadtext{and}qquad
mathrm{im}(d^r_p)=B^{r+1}_p/B^r_p;.$$
For $a=eta(a_0)in H(p,p+1)$, $a_0in H(p,p+r)$, one has
$$d^r_p([a])=[partial a_0]in E^r_pqquadtext{with}qquadpartial a_0in H(p+r,p+r+1);.$$



Definition (Douady, II.A)
Let $(H,eta,partial)$, $(H',eta',partial')$ und $(H'',eta'',partial'')$ be Cartan-Eilenberg systems. A spectral product $mucolon(H',partial')times(H'',partial'')to(H,partial)$ is a sequence of maps
$$mu_rcolon H'(m,m+r)otimes H''(n,n+r)to H(m+n,m+n+r)$$
such that for all $m$, $n$, $rge 1$, the following two diagrams commute.
$require{AMScd}$
begin{CD}
H'(m,m+r)otimes H''(n,n+r)@>mu_r>>H(m+n,m+n+r)\
@Veta'oplus Veta''V@VVeta V\
H'(m,m+1)otimes H''(n,n+1)@>mu_1>>H(m+n,m+n+1)rlap{;,}
end{CD}
begin{CD}
H'(m,m+r)otimes H''(n,n+r)@>mu_r>>H(m+n,m+n+r)\
@Vpartial'otimeseta''oplus Veta'otimespartial''V@VVpartial V\
{begin{matrix}H'(m+r,m+r+1)otimes H''(n,n+1)\oplus\H'(m,m+1)otimes H''(n+r,n+r+1)end{matrix}}@>mu_1+mu_1>>H_{p+q-1}(m+n+r,m+n+r+1)rlap{;.}
end{CD}



The first diagram is weaker than in Douady's notes.
The second can be read as a Leibniz rule.



Theorem (Douady, Thm II)
A spectral product $mucolon(H',partial')times(H'',partial'')to(H,partial)$ induces products
$$mu^rcolon E^{prime r}_motimes E^{primeprime r}_nto E^r_{m+n};,$$
such that



  1. $mu^1=mu_1$


  2. $d^r_{m+n}circmu^r=mu^rcirc(d^{prime r}_motimesmathrm{id})pmmu^rcirc(mathrm{id}circ d^{primeprime r}_n)$,


  3. $mu^{r+1}$ is induced by $mu^r$.




Proof.
Assume by induction that $mu^r$ is induced by $mu_1$. In particular,
$$Z^{prime r}_motimes Z^{primeprime r}_nstackrel{mu_1}to Z^r_{m+n};,$$
$$B^{prime r}_motimes Z^{primeprime r}_nstackrel{mu_1}to B^r_{m+n};,$$
$$Z^{prime r}_motimes B^{primeprime r}_nstackrel{mu_1}to B^r_{m+n};.$$
This is clear for $r=1$ if we put $mu^1=mu_1$ because $E^1_p=Z^1_p=H(p,p+1)$
and $B^1_p=0$.



Let $[a]in Z^{prime r}_m$, $[b]in Z^{primeprime r}_n$ be represented by $a=eta'(a_0)in H'(m,m+1)$, $b=eta''(b_0)in H''(n,n+1)$ with $a_0in H'(m,m+r)$, $b_0in H''(n,n+r)$.
Using the first diagram and the construction of $d^r_{m+n}$, we conclude that
$$(d^r_{m+n}circmu^r)([a]otimes[b])=d^r_{m+n}[mu_1(aotimes b)]=d^r_{m+n}[eta(mu_r(a_0otimes b_0))]=(partialcircmu_r)(a_0otimes b_0);.$$
From the second diagram, we get
$$(partialcircmu_r)(a_0otimes b_0)=mu_1(partial'a_0otimeseta''b_0)pmmu_1(eta'a_0otimespartial''b_0)=mu^r(d^{prime r}_m[a]otimes[b])pmmu^r([a]otimes d^{primeprime r}_n[b]);.$$
This proves the Leibniz rule (2).



From the Leipniz rule and the facts that $ker(d^r_p)=Z^{r+1}_p/B^r_p$ and $mathrm{im}(d^r_p)=B^{r+1}_p/B^r_p$, we conclude that $mu^r$ induces a product on $E^{r+1}_pcongker(d^r_p)/mathrm{im}(d^r_p)$, which proves (3). Because $mu^r$ is induced by $mu_1$, so is $mu^{r+1}$, and we can continue the induction.

grammar - Usage of "of" in the following sentence


Gender inequality refers to unequal treatment or perceptions of individuals based on their gender.




This sentence structure, unequal treatment or perceptions, should be treated as if it is saying unequal treatment or unequal perceptions.



of individuals based on their gender is the prepositional phrase, and it modifies both unequal treatment and unequal perceptions.



Written in its expanded form, this sentence states, therefore,




Gender inequality refers to unequal treatment of individuals based on their gender or unequal perceptions of individuals based on their gender.




Obviously, this does not happen spontaneously; someone is doing it. In this case, someone is doing this to other individuals, but this is implied or taken for granted. If you want to incorporate who is doing what to whom, you can include the implied doer of the action by expanding it further. The doer can be someone, anyone, people, any 'other'.




Gender inequality refers to anyone's unequal treatment of individuals based on their gender, or anyone's unequal perceptions of individuals based on their gender.




If this does not clear up the confusion please feel free to ask me further questions in the comment section.

grammar - Can 'default' be an adverb?

Consider the following sentence:




Whenever possible, default and explicitly mapped names are honored as written.




It seems to me that default and explicitly both talk about how the names are mapped, and thus default would also be an adverb, but I don't see default listed as an adverb in the dictionary.



But they could also be nouns when written as thus:




Whenever possible, default and explicit mapped names are honored as written.




What would be the clearest way to write this and can 'default' be an adverb as shown above.



Another pass at the sentence might read:




Whenever possible, default mapped names and explicitly mapped names are honored as written.


Friday, 27 May 2016

harry potter - How do muggles communicate with their magical children when they're at Hogwarts?

We know that Muggle mail can reach Hogwarts - Petunia once wrote a letter to Dumbledore, and he replied. We also know that the Dursley's were able to send Harry his Christmas presents; given their distaste for magic it is safe to assume that they would not have done so had it involved using an owl or any other magical means.



Snape, when he was a child, speculated that there are wizards working undercover in the Muggle Post Office, who would presumably intercept any mail meant for the wizarding world and pass it on by owl:




[...] "Severus saw the envelope, and he couldn't believe a Muggle could have contacted Hogwarts, that's all! He says there must be wizards working undercover in the postal service who take care of - "



"Apparently wizards poke their noses in everywhere!" said Petunia.



Deathly Hallows, Chapter 33, The Prince's Tale




(We don't have any canon evidence on this point as far as I know, but for the purposes of this question the details don't really matter and are probably subject to change anyway.)

The lie algebra of the orthogonal group of an arbitrary space time metric

Let X ad Y be two vectors in R4, and define the inner product of X and Y as:



(X*Y) = gikXiYk (summation convention for repeated indicies)



Then we consider the 4x4 matrix g whose components are gik. I am of course interested in the case that g is NOT positive definite, because this is the situation when g represents the gravitational field in general relativity.



Let A be a 4x4 matrix which satisfies (X*Y) = (AX*AY), then I say that A is an element O(g), the orthogonal group determined by g.



I am interested in finding any sort of formula which relates the lie algebra of O(g) to the metric g.



In a previous question, it was suggested that I diagonalize the matrix g using the theorem on diagonalizing positive definite matrices. This method works nicely and gives a simple solution for the lie algebra in terms of the transformation matrix which diagonalizes g, but only when g is positive definite.



Can I still diagonalize my non positive definite g by finding the roots of the characteristic polynomial? I believe I must first somehow restrict the set of vectors I allow the inner product to work on, to avoid the case (X*Y) = 0. Nevertheless, for arguments sake let's assume that I can diagonalize g.



Let B be the transformation matrix, then I assume that I can write:



g = B-1ηB, where η is the identity matrix of signature (1,3), i.e. the metric of flat space time.



We can characterize the elements of O(g) by realizing that our inner product can be written as:



(X*Y) = XTgY



It's clear that if A is an element of O(g), then



(AX*AY) = XTATgAY = XTgY



Hence, ATgA = g



This formula can be written as gA-1g = AT, since g = g-1 explicitly.



Now applying the transformation matrix B:



gA-1g = B-1ηBA-1B-1ηB = AT, which I rearrange as:



ηBA-1B-1η = BATB-1



If by some chance (BA-1B-1)-1 = (BATB-1)T, then I can immediately conclude that A is in O(g) so long as BA-1B-1 is in O(1,3) (the group which preserves the metric η). From this step is it quite straightforward to compute the lie algebra, by taking advantage of the formula BeXB-1 = eBXB-1.



I am concerned about several steps of this procedure:



1) Is it legal to diagonalize g? I believe I need exclude any combination of vectors X, Y for which (X*Y) = 0. Since the squared norm is (X*X), then this amounts to disregarding vectors which lie along geodesic paths. Then I can deal separately for the case (X*X) > 0 and (X*X) < 0.



2) How am I supposed to deal with the condition that (BA-1B-1)-1 = (BATB-1)T? This condition seems quite restrictive.