I'm not sure I completely understand what you're asking, but here is some information that appears to be relevant.
In the context you're describing, you have two languages: the pure language L0 of groups and the augmented language L1 of groups together with a linear representation over some field (see note). You seem to be asking the following:
- When does a sentence in L1 (i.e. a property of groups with linear representations) equivalent to a sentence in L0 (i.e. a pure property of groups)?
The Robinson Consistency Theorem answers this, at least in part.
Let G be a group and let L2 be the language of groups augmented with a constant for every element of G. Let T2 be the complete theory of G in L2 and let T0 = T2 ∩ L0 be the complete theory of G in L0. The difference between T0 and T2 is that statements in T2 are allowed to mention particular elements of G. So if x is an element of order 2 in G, then that fact is recorded in T2 but not in T0. However, the fact that G has an element of order 2 is recorded in T0 since that fact does not explicitly mention any element of G.
Now let φ be any statement in the language L1 of groups with linear representations. The Robinson Consistency Theorem says that if T0 ∪ T1 ∪ {φ} is consistent then so is T2 ∪ T1 ∪ {φ}, where T1 ⊆ L1 is the theory of linear representations (see note). Stated differently, T2 ∪ T1 ⊦ φ if and only if T0 ∪ T1 ⊦ φ. (Recall that T ⊦ φ iff T ∪ {¬φ} is inconsistent.) The models of T2 are precisely the elementary extensions of G. Thus the following are equivalent:
- φ is a consequence of some purely group theoretic property of G
- φ is true for every linear representation of an elementary extension of G
Sometimes we can say more. If φ is an existential statement in L1 (i.e. φ is equivalent to a sentence of the form ∃x,y,z,...φ0(x,y,z,...) where φ0 is quantifier free) then we don't have to check all elementary extensions of G. Thus, for such φ, the following are equivalent:
- φ is true in all linear representations of G
- φ is a consequence of some purely group theoretic property of G
Of course, the Robinson Consistency Theorem is not particular to groups and linear representations of groups; the same reasoning applies in all sorts of contexts.
Note: I'm assuming that all languages are first-order (possibly with multiple sorts). There are various ways to formulate linear representations in first-order logic, but none are completely satisfactory. For fixed dimension n, one can add a sort F for the field elements together with functions ai,j:G→F for the entries of the matrices of the representations. Then T1 consists of all field axioms together with all required identities between the ai,j.
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